"Seed Capital" Social field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of a conditional cash program that financially incentivizes work related reduction of disability benefits. The high implicit taxation of employment income (i.e. disabled lose benefits if labor incomes exceed a certain threshold) is considered one of the prime reasons for the low outflow from disability insurance. This project evaluates a conditional cash program that financially incentivizes work related reduction of disability benefits. A randomized group of disability insurance beneficiaries received the offer to claim a payment (“seed capital”) of CHF 9,000/18,000 if they take up or expand employment and reduce disability insurance claims by at least one quarter. The maximum payment for a reduction from a full pension to no pension is thus CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000). The results show that interest in taking-up the financial incentive is low at only 3%. Doubling the incentive does not result in higher interest. This project was commissioned by the Federal Social Insurance Office and carried out in cooperation with the Swiss Institute for Empirical Economic Research (SEW-HSG). For further Information see Link in the columne right.